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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DELIVERY OF A KEY TO LINDA THOMAS 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE DELIVERY OF THE 
DEED. 
Throughout the Trial, counsel for Linda Thomas took the position that 
the signing of the Deed and the giving of copies of the Deed to Linda Thomas 
and Connie Rowan constituted delivery. It appears from Appellee's brief, that 
the focus has now shifted to the delivery of a key to the Mr. Jackson's safety 
deposit box has in some way constituted delivery of the deed. In Point III of 
Appellant's original brief, the text of Linda Thomas' testimony is set out 
verbatim but in short, Linda Thomas testified that she was uncertain when the 
key was delivered to her but when asked whether it was longer than one year, 
she indicated no and when asked whether it was within two months, she said 
she could not really say (record 59, page 27, line 17- page 28, line 4). When 
asked regarding the reason she was given a key and what discussions were had 
between her and her father regarding the purpose for giving her a key, she 
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stated, "He showed me where he keeps the keys and he just said, I lose a lot of 
keys so here is a copy." (R59 P25 lines 1, 2) Mr. Jackson did not say anything 
with regard to her ability to get into the safety deposit box; did not discuss the 
contents of the safety deposit box; nor did he even make mention of the Deed 
at the time the key was given to Linda Thomas, (see R59, P 24, L 19 - P25, 
L13). 
It is apparent from Linda Thomas' own testimony that there was no 
expression of intent to deliver the Deed in conjunction with the giving of the 
key but rather only an explanation that "I lose a lot of keys so here's a copy." 
(R59 P.25 lines 1,2,) 
Ms. Thomas cites in her Brief Agrelius v. Mohesky, 494 P.2d 1095 
(Kansas 1972) for the proposition that the delivery of a key constitutes delivery 
of the deed. The Court in its own opinion clearly stated that the mere giving of 
a key is not sufficient to constitute delivery of the Deed. 
It may be conceded that the act of placing an executed Deed 
in a safety deposit box, to which the grantor has the sole or one of 
several keys, is not sufficient of itself to evidence the delivery of a 
deed. However, when such action is coupled with other evidence 
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disclosing an intent to deliver a present title, a sufficient showing 
of delivery may be made out. (Emphasis added) Id. at 1101. 
The background in Agrelius contained a situation in which mom and dad 
executed two deeds on the same day each conveying an 80 acre farm to each of 
their two sons Clair and Kenneth. The Court then went on to state: 
On a subsequent occasion in 1944, Mr. Agrelius told Clair 
of the deeds, handed him a key to the safety deposit box and said, 
according to Clair, that the deed was in the locked box and that 
"WW Parker told him that that constituted delivery of the deed to 
me." Clair first saw the deeds in 1962 at the time of his father's 
death, but did not remove them from the box until after his 
mother's death in 1967, at which time he took them to be 
recorded. 
The Trial Court held that delivery of both the deeds was 
effected at the time Claire was handed the key. The question 
before us is whether the court, under all the facts and 
circumstances, was justified in drawing the inference that the 
deeds were delivered during the grantor's lives... Id. at 1101 
The Court then concluded that the delivery of the key with the 
expression of intent by the grantor constituted delivery of the deed. The facts 
in Agrelius are much different from the facts at hand. 
According to Linda Thomas' testimony, there was no discussion with 
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regard to the deed when Mr. Jackson supposedly gave her the key. Linda 
Thomas' own testimony was that Mr. Jackson was giving her the key in case 
Mr. Jackson's key was lost. 
As pointed out by the Trial Court, Linda Thomas had the burden of proof 
of showing that delivery of the deed occurred. The mere giving of a key to her 
for safe keeping falls far short of a delivery of the deed. Even if Linda Thomas 
possessed a key to the safety deposit box during the life of Mr. Jackson it did 
not mean that the bank would provide her access to the safety deposit box. 
Linda Thomas who has the burden of proof did not provide any evidence at 
Trial that she was one of the lessee's on the safety deposit box at the bank. It is 
clear from her testimony, however, that she never accessed the safety deposit 
box during the life of Mr. Jackson nor was she ever instructed by Mr. Jackson 
to access the safety deposit box and obtain the deed. 
POINT II 
ONE WHO ASSERTS AN INTER VIVOS GIFT 
FROM A DECEASED'S ESTATE MUST SHOW 
THAT INTENTION BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
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Ms. Thomas in her brief cites Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 286 
P.63 8 (Utah 1930) for the proposition that the giving of a key constitutes 
delivery. The Utah Supreme Court case in Christensen does not further Ms. 
Thomas' position. 
In Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, the Supreme Court was called upon 
to make a determination of whether a delivery had occurred of a passbook 
savings account. Although the Court in Christensen did not involve the 
transfer of a deed of real estate, the principles outlined with regard to the 
establishment of an inter vivos gift are instructive to this Court. 
In Christensen, Jens Christensen was the owner of a savings account at 
Ogden State Bank. The ownership of the account was documented in the 
ledgers at the Bank and evidenced by a passbook which showed the deposits 
and withdrawals from the savings account. Mr. Christensen during his lifetime 
signed a card transferring the name designation on the account to read, "Jens 
Christensen, book #25695, 2877 Grant Avenue, City or Antone Christensen 
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payable to either or survivor." Id. 640. The passbook was never given to 
Antone Christensen but was held in the safety deposit box. 
Antone Christensen asserted the position that since the records of the 
bank reflected ownership in himself as well as Jens Christensen that he should 
be entitled to the savings account. The Ogden State Bank and Jens 
Christensen's widow asserted the position that since the passbook was not 
physically transferred or given to Antone Christensen that the inter vivos gift 
was incomplete. 
The Court determined that since the passbook was not delivered to 
Antone Christensen that it was not a completed gift and ruled in favor of 
Ogden State Bank and Jens Christensen's widow, thus reversing the decision of 
the trial court. The Court stated as follows with regard to the requirements of a 
gift: 
When the claim of a gift is not asserted until after the death 
of the alleged donor, it should be sustained by clear and 
satisfactory evidence of every element which is requisite to 
constitute a gift. Robinson v. Bank, supra. 
He who attempts to establish title to property through a gift 
inter vivos as against the estate of a decedent, takes upon himself a 
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heavy burden, which he must support by evidence of great 
probative force which clearly establishes every element of a valid 
gift, - that the decedent intended to divest himself of the title in 
favor of the donee, and accompanied his intent by delivery of the 
subject matter of the gift. Matter of O'ConnelK supra. 
Mindful of the facility with which, after the alleged donor is 
dead, fraudulent claims of ownership may be founded on 
pretended gifts of his property asserted to have been made while 
he was living, it is a but a salutary precaution which demands 
explicit and convincing evidence of every element needed to 
constitute a valid donation, whether it be a donation inter vivos or 
mortis causa. Even then fraudulent claims may prevail. But the 
rigid requirement of the clearest proof will at least diminish the 
number. Waylen v. Milhollen, Supra. 
It is an elementary rule of law that in gifts inter vivos as 
well as gifts causa mortis the title to the thing given must pass 
from the donor to the donee. In contemplation of the law there 
must be no executory gift... 
... If the decedent intended that the title to the savings 
account, should, during his life, pass to Plaintiff, it is difficult to 
understand why the deceased did not deliver the key to the safety 
deposit box to his brother or perform some other act calculated to 
make it possible for him to get possession of the passbook. 
Likewise, if the deceased intended to part with title to the account, 
it is difficult to understand why he should have worried about the 
paper that he had signed while at the hospital and to entertain the 
hope that he would fool those who were trying to get his money. 
While there may be circumstances which will support a gift or 
voluntary trust in a savings deposit account in the absence of 
delivery of the passbook and in the absence of the changing of the 
names of the persons to whom the passbook is issued, we are of 
the opinion that record in this case does not justify sustaining the 
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claim of Plaintiff to the savings deposit account upon either of 
Plaintiffs theories. As we review this record, we are forced to the 
conclusion that the deceased intended that the Title to the same in 
his account should remain in himself until his death. Id. 643, 644. 
As set out in Christensen cited by Appellee, the court was unwilling to 
find an inter vivos gift based upon the facts of that case, and consequently 
reversed the Trial Court. 
The final case cited by Ms. Thomas is Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 
(Utah 1979) the Court sets out the standard as follows: 
The rule is well settled that a deed, to be operative as a 
transfer of the ownership of land, or an interest or estate, therein 
must be delivered. It was equally settled in this and the vast 
majority of jurisdictions that a valid delivery of a deed requires 
that it pass beyond the control or domain of the grantor. The 
requisite relinquishment or control or dominion over the deed may 
be established, notwithstanding the fact that the deed is in 
possession of the grantor at her death, by proof of facts which tend 
to show delivery had been made with the intention to pass title and 
to explain the grantor's subsequent possession. However, in order 
for delivery effectively to transfer title, the grantor must part with 
possession of the deed or the right to retain it. Id. at 1352. 
Ms. Thomas makes no effort to attempt to explain why there may have 
been a valid delivery even though Mr. Jackson retained possession of the deed. 
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Linda Thomas' own testimony stated that there was no discussion with regard 
to the deed when she supposedly received the key, but rather only that she was 
given the key because her father stated that he loses keys. 
CONCLUSION 
If one takes all of the facts as testified to by Linda Thomas and Connie 
Rowan from the time that the Deed itself was signed until Mr. Jackson's death, 
one cannot say that Mr. Jackson ever allowed the Deed to be taken out of his 
possession or ever gave up his right to retain it. The Deed was signed at First 
Security Bank and notarized after which Mr. Jackson physically carried the 
Deed from First Security Bank back to Mr. Coxson's law office. Mr. Jackson 
allowed Mr. Coxson to make copies and give copies to his daughters Connie 
Rowan and Linda Thomas, but then retained the original Deed in his 
possession. When invited by his attorney to allow the attorney to record the 
Deed, Mr. Jackson declined. When instructed by Mr. Coxson that the Deed 
must be recorded in order to complete the transaction, again Mr. Jackson 
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declined to record the Deed. Mr. Jackson, Connie Rowan, and Linda Thomas, 
then left the law office with again Mr. Jackson physically retaining the Deed in 
his personal possession; they dropped Linda Thomas off at her house and then 
Mr. Jackson and Connie Rowan traveled to Central Bank in Springville, Utah, 
where Mr. Jackson placed the Deed in a safety deposit box for safe keeping. 
Neither Connie Rowan nor Linda Thomas had access to the safety deposit box 
when the Deed was placed in it. According to Linda Thomas at a later date 
somewhere between two months and one year later, she was given a key to the 
safety deposit box with an explanation that Mr. Jackson loses keys and so he 
was giving her a copy. At the time of Mr. Jackson's death, the Deed was 
retrieved from the safety deposit box. 
Based upon the foregoing there is certainly not clear and convincing 
evidence of Mr. Jackson's intent to deliver the Deed or to relinquish his 
possession of it. 
The only clear intent on Mr. Jackson's part comes from his testamentary 
expression which were in writing in the Codicil wherein he specifically sets out 
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nominal amounts to be paid to Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan and the 
remainder of the house to be given to his wife Maria Jackson. 
It is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the decision of the 
District Court in finding that there was not a delivery of the Deed and that the 
home should pass according to Mr. Jackson's testamentary desires as set out in 
his Codicil to his Will. 
DATED this J ^ _ day of April, 2001. 
L 
MICHAEL K. BLACK 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the (C day of April 2001,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Gary H. Weight, Esq. 
43 East 200 North 
BoxL 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 [i\(L,{ l^%ki 
13 
